What is a new energy cooperation framework for energy storage and prosumers?

A novel energy cooperation framework for energy storage and prosumers is proposed. A bi-level energy trading model considering the network constraints is presented. A profit-sharing mechanism is designed with the asymmetric Nash bargaining model. The adaptive alternating direction method of multipliers is applied efficiently.

What is a two-stage model for energy storage sharing?

For example, formulated a two-stage model for energy storage sharing between CESSs and prosumers, where CESSs decide the price of virtual storage capacity in the first stage and prosumers decide the capacities and charging/discharging power in the second stage.

Can a new energy cooperation framework improve the energy economy?

A novel energy cooperation framework for CESSs and prosumers is proposed with an energy cooperation platform as an intermediary, improving the energy economy and solution efficiency.

How to ensure the feasibility of cooperation between platform and prosumers?

To ensure the feasibility of cooperation, the energy sharing profiles and payment profiles between platform and prosumers/CESSs must be mutually agreed, that is: (15) (16) (17) (18) where are the Lagrange multipliers of equations (15), (16). The platform needs to meet the balance of energy sharing and payment as follows: (19) (20)

What is the proposed energy cooperation problem?

The proposed energy cooperation problem requires minimizing the social energy costs, which includes all the individual energy costs of prosumers and CESSs. The energy cooperation problem is stated as: (21) Subject to: {(1) - (7), (9), (10) - (20)} (22) (23)

What is the energy cooperation framework for cess & prosumers?

Energy cooperation framework for CESSs and prosumers. Formally, according to reference , since the payments between members within the cooperation do not affect the formulation of trading strategies, the energy cooperation problem can be decomposed into two subproblems: the energy trading subproblem and the profit-sharing subproblem.